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         The project is aimed to utilize layer of protection analysis (LOPA) to verify safety 
integrity level (SIL) of safety instrumented system. Safety instrumented system (SIS) is 
the last resort in case of emergency happened in plant. Determining the specific safety 
requirement of safety systems is a vital part to ensure accidents are prevented. Previous 
study is carried out till classification of Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) for hazardous 
installation by using the risk assessment techniques. In this study, the focus will be on 
SIL classification and verification in safety instrumented system (SIS).  
 
           The program is developed using Microsoft Excel based on established 
methodology found in the literatures. Thorough literature surveys are expected in order 
to gather appropriate SIL verification information which will further integrate in existing 
spreadsheet. The program is tested using two case studies related to process plant 
industries. The results obtained show the sufficiency of the protection system and 
provide risk control strategy including number of SIL required in case of the protection 
is insufficient. If the protection system is sufficient, it will ensure the design is the 
optimum. Reliability and accurateness of the result are vital due to main function of the 
program is to assess and validate the SIS.  
 
           The application is used either in designing the SIS or in auditing the effectiveness 
of the installed SIS. The verification of assigned SIL to a particular Safety Instrumented 
Function (SIF) is still new compared to SIL classification. Based on industrial 
perspective, there is no established method on verification of an installed SIS. Most 
scenarios can be catered by enhancing the existing design rather than adding safety 
protection layer.                                                              
 
             Future study shall be continued to improve the relevancy and reliability of the 
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                                         INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Project’s Background 
 
Accidents at any plant either offshore or onshore may result in casualties and economic 
loss. Safety instrumented system (SIS) is the last automatic protection system in case of 
emergency happened in plant. Determining the specific safety requirement of safety 
systems is vital part in ensuring that accidents are prevented. In the 1990s the standards 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 emerged and the need for documenting compliance with 
these in a consistent manner led to the introduction of the layer of protection analysis 
(LOPA) (Lassen, 2008). 
 
LOPA method is being used to determine if there are sufficient layers of protection 
against an accident scenario. A scenario may require one or many protection layer 
depending on complexity and potential severity of the process. For a given scenario, 
only one layer must work successfully for the consequence to be prevented. (CCPS, 
2001).  Due to no layer is perfectly effective, sufficient protection layer must be 
provided to minimize the risk of accident tolerable.  
 
In this project, the framework of LOPA method is combined with framework of safety 
integrity level (SIL) to assess the effectiveness of SIS. The SIL is the key design 
parameter specifying the amount of risk reduction that the safety equipment is required 
to achieve for a particular function in question. It is based on probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) for a specific safety instrumentation function (SIF) in safety instrumented 
system. The suitable SIL assigned is inline with the concept of as low as reasonably 





1.2 Problem statement 
 
Various methods in selecting safety integrity levels (SILs) have been proposed and 
adopted by industry. The result of using poor methods to select SILs is typically either 
an overdesigned or an under designed safety instrumented system (SIS). In today 
practice, evaluation and verification of SIL on SIS is rarely being applied. SIL 
classification is only performed during design phase. This situation has lead to 
decrement of independent protection layer (IPL)’s audit-ability which violating the 
IPL’s rule. Other problem is lack of a comprehensive discussion of SIL verification 
compared to SIL classification. Therefore, this study will focus on classification and 
verification of SIL on SIS which it is hoped that it will be the initiating step for further 
development of proper SIL verification method. However, the subject is still new since 
the literature of the subject is small in amount and moreover is scattered among various 
periodicals and symposia. Hence, a rigorous literature reviews and discussion with 
expert from industries are expected throughout the study. 
 
1.3 Objective  
 
The objectives of this study are listed as follows: 
 
• To utilize Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) method in the verification of Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) of instrumentation system. 
• To develop framework of LOPA and SIL including a common terminology and 
worksheet. 











1.4 Scope of the Project 
 
The scope of study will involve the utilization LOPA method in the determining the 
safety integrity level (SIL) of instrumented system. The project will focus on 
combining the framework of SIL and LOPA and implement both procedures in a 
practical case study. Apart from that, the study also will focus on classification and 
verification of SIL on Safety Instrumented System (SIS). In this project, the case 
study related to one of the oil and gas industries will be discussed. 
             
              1.4.1 Relevancy of the Project 
 
The purpose of this project is to combine the framework of LOPA and SIL and 
implement both of the procedure in industry case study. The subject is still new 
since the literature of the subject is small in amount and moreover is scattered 
among various periodicals and symposia. Hence, a comprehensive discussion of 
the process of selecting SILs is a need and the application of the combination 
between LOPA and SIL method will be shown in the study. 
 
            1.4.2 Feasibility of the Project within the Scope and Time Frame 
 
This project will start by collecting the reading material such as the books, 
journals, related website, thorough discussion with supervisor and collaboration 
from industrial practitioners. At the end of Final Year Project (FYP) 1, it is 
expected that the literature survey on LOPA approaches have been carried out 
and understand all the basic concept of the LOPA approach. Meanwhile, for 
Final Year Project (FYP) 2, the study will focus on implementing the approach 








2.1.  Layer of Protection Analysis  
 
Layer of protection analysis is a semi-quantitative risk analysis technique that is 
applied following qualitative hazard identification tool such as HAZOP. LOPA is 
described as semi-qualitative due to the technique does use numbers and generate a 
numerical risk estimate. The primary purpose of LOPA is to determine if there are 






















Based on Figure 1, many type of protection layer are possible. A scenario may require 
one or many protection layers depending on the process complexity and potential 
severity of a consequence (CCPS, 2001). Theoretically, only one layer is enough to 
prevent the consequence. However in reality, no layer is perfectly effective. Therefore, 
sufficient protection layer must be provided to minimize the risk of accident.  
 
For LOPA, the term Independent protection layer (IPL) is used rigorously to describe 
the protection layer. An IPL must be effective in reducing risk and must be auditable 
(Wei et al., 2008). Each layer should be analyzed to determine its basic independence 
from the initiating event and from the other protection layers. A probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) is assigned to an IPL to account for its reliability to respond to system 
demand. 
 
LOPA is limited to evaluating a single cause-consequence pair as a scenario. In this 
context, a LOPA scenario represents one path. Normally the path to the worst 
consequence is selected via an event tree. Figure 2 shows an event tree for a given 


















According to Marszal and Scharpf, (2002), LOPA can be viewed as a special type of 
event tree analysis (ETA) as illustrated in Figure 2, which has the purpose of 
determining the frequency of unwanted consequence that can be prevented by a set of 
protection layers. As mentioned before, the approach evaluates a worst-case scenario 
where all the protection layers must fail in order for the consequence to occur. Assuming 
the layers are determined to be independent, the final mitigated event frequency, f iC , is 
calculated by multiplying the initial cause frequency, f i1, by the PFDs of the individual 
IPLs, PFDij , as shown in Equation 1 (CCPS, 2001). 
 
𝑓𝑓i
C = f iC × ∏ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ij𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖   (1) 
 
2.2. Limitation of LOPA method 
 
It is important to fully understand the limitation of the selected approach to ensure the 
LOPA works best and delivers accurate and reliable result. LOPA is limited to 
evaluating a single-cause consequence pair as a scenario. A method such as fault tree or 
event tree analysis is more suitable in case of more detailed and complex issues. Besides 
that, LOPA may be inappropriate for a very high consequence event according to Figure 
3. Based on ANSI /ISA S84.01, if the consequence estimation is too severe or the 
likelihood too aggressive, the final selected Safety Integrity Level may be too high 
which result in an over designed and over costly Safety Instrument System (SIS). The 





























Figure 3: Spectrum of tool for risk-based decision making (CCPS, 2001). 
 
 
Moreover, the LOPA breaks down with human initiated events covered by human 
initiated safeguard with little or no equipment intervention (equipment failure, 
equipment sensing, equipment activated functions) (PETRONAS Group Technology 
Solution, 2009). Human errors are very difficult to quantify and can be easily extend 
outside the capabilities of limited database driven methodology such as LOPA. It works 
best when the scenario being evaluated is dominated by equipment/instrument failures, 
sensors and logic driven field element with little or no human intervention. Another 
caution is to avoid incorporating an IPL failure into the initiating event frequency. As 
described in (CCPS, 2001) it will jeopardize the PFD for a human IPL. 









2.3 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
 
The concept of safety integrity levels (SILs) was introduced during the development of 
BS EN 61508 (BSI 2002) as a measure of the quality or dependability of a system which 
has a safety function- a measure of the confidence with which the system can be 
expected to perform that function (Gulland, 2004). In other word, SIL is a way to 
indicate the tolerable failure of a particular safety function. The method of SIL 
classification is described in next chapter. 
 
There are several people developed LOPA application. For example Markowski and 
Mannan, (2009) have developed pfLOPA tool for pipeline industries. The fuzzy piping 
risk assessments enable a better pipelines risk assessment output compare to classical 
LOPA in term of incident scenario risk and appropriate selection and assessment of layer 
protection. Wei et al., (2009) have developed a simplified semi-quantitative risk analysis 
model using LOPA to evaluate a highly reactive process and furthermore it illustrates 
the benefits of risk assessment to follow HAZOP hazard analysis. Guo and Yang (2007) 
developed a simple reliability block diagram (RBD) method for safety integrity 
verification. The RBD analysis is carried out to compute the PFDavg of voted group and 
it yield the result that is accordance with those in IEC 61508-6. This method can be 
applied to the quantitative SIL verification. Besides, it helps those take IEC 61508-6 as 
their guidance. 
 
On the other hand, Kosmowski, (2006) have proposed a formal method to describe web 
applications by means of process algebra which can be automatically verified by a 
model checker. Andrews and Bartlett, (2005) introduced a branching search approach. 
The approach has proven to be effective for High Integrity Protection System (HIPS) 
safety system optimization. This method shows potential for application to a wider range 
of problem. According to Mannan et al., (2004), using point values in calculating the 
overall system safety availability or SIL may lead result in misleading evaluation of SIL 
of an SIS. In the paper, they proposed practical and efficient procedures to deal with data 
uncertainty in determining SIL for an SIS and identify the inputs that may lead to a 
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change in the estimation of SIL. This methodology will guide SIS designers and process 
hazard analysts toward a more accurate SIL estimation and avoid misleading results due 
to data uncertainty.  
 
Stavrianidis and Bhimavarapu, (1998) have discussed two performance safety standards 
(ANSI/ISA S84.01 IEC d61508). In order to comply to the standard requires a hazards 
and risk analysis to establish the safety requirements for safety instrumented functions in 
terms of SIL. The identified safety instrumented functions were then conceptually 























2.4 SIL and SIS Development 
 
The concept of SIL was initially introduced during the development of BS EN 61508 
(BSI 2002) as a measure of the quality or dependability of a system which has a safety 
function.  
 
Previous study completed until determination of scenario frequencies and making risk 
decision (SIL selection) where SIL is determined using LOPA method which follows 6 
steps shown below: 
 
 Step 1: Estimating Consequences and Severity 
 Step 2: Developing Scenarios 
 Step 3: Identifying Initiating Event Frequency 
 Step 4: Identifying Related IPLs 
 Step 5: Determining Scenario Frequency 
 Step 6: Making Risk Decision. Determine SIL 
 
The scenarios or sequence of events are developed using event tree analysis from 
initiating event till results in an undesirable outcomes. Figure 4 is the example of the 
event tree developed from previous study by Zatil, (2009). Based on the 2 examples 
given below, the previous study uses spreadsheet tool to calculate the required SIL of 
each initiating event based on the event tree analysis. The scenario frequency is then 
calculated using equation 1 prior computing the LOPA ratio shown in Equation 2 
(CCPS, 2001). From the LOPA ratio gained using equation 2, the SIL target can be 
determined using Table 4. However, it does not specifically indicate the 
recommendation required for each case. In other word, it studied on SIL evaluation on 
safety instrumented function (SIF). As mentioned before, the current study will continue 
the previous work by focusing SIL evaluation on SIS which will give well and more 
specific recommendation for each case which will be further discussed in next chapter.  
 LOPA ratio, LR =  Risk  ToleranceScenario  frequency           (2)   
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According to PETRONAS Group Technology Solution, (2009) if LR ≥ 1, there is no 
need to add other IPL  otherwise additional IPL is required.   
Zatil, (2009) has developed a tool, which is capable to determine SIL. In example 1, the 
initiating event is pressure vessel residual failure where the failure rate is 0.000001. 
Table 1 shows four Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) to prevent the undesirable 
outcomes to occur which initiated by pressure vessel residual failure. Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) method as shown in Figure 4 is used to develop the scenario of each 
initiating event. Scenario frequency is determined using ETA method and is the result is 
shown in Figure 5.  
 
Table 1: PFD of IPLs in example 1 (Zatil, 2009) 











Identifier B C D E 
PFD 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.01 
 
 
Figure 4: Event tree analysis of pressure vessel relief valve failure (Zatil, 2009) 
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Based on Figure 5, once the scenario frequency is gained, the LOPA ratio can be 
calculated. The ratio gained will determine the SIL required. 
 
 
Figure 5: Result from the spreadsheet (Zatil, 2009) 
 
The methodology used in example 1 is same with example 2. The initiating event for 
this case is pump seal failure which its probability to occur is 0.1. The lists of available 
IPLs are shown in Table 2. The probability of failure of each IPLs also available which 
can be obtained in CCPS database. 
 
 
Example 2: Pump Seal Failure (0.1) 
Table 2: PFD of IPLs in example 2 (Zatil, 2009) 
Safety Function: Inherently Safe Design Operator Response 
Identifier B C 
PFD 0.01 0.1 
 
In order to compute the scenario frequency, again the ETA method is used and is shown 























The results obtained using the application developed by Zatil, (2009) are tabulated in 
Table 3. Noted that each initiating causes have been assessed its risk tolerability. Based 
on Table 3, the maximum SIL assigned is 1 for the case of intolerable risk while the rest 
are tolerable in terms of risk. It does not specifically mention the recommendation or 
action plan needed to make the risk is tolerable.  
 
Table 3: Risk tolerability of initiating event (Zatil, 2009) 
No Initiating Causes Risk is tolerable/intolerable 
1 BPCS Instrument Loop Failure Tolerable 
3 Fixed Equipment Failure SIL 1 
4 Pumps & other Rotating Equipments SIL 1 
5 Cooling Water Failure SIL 1 
6 Loss of Power Tolerable 
7 Human Error (Routine task, 1 per day opportunity) SIL 1 
8 Human Error(Routine Task, Once-per-month opportunity) SIL 1 
9 Human Error ((Non-Routine Task, Low Stress) SIL 1 
10 Human Error (Non-Routine Task, High Stress) SIL 1 
11 Pressure Vessel Residual Failure Tolerable 
12 Piping Residual Failure-100m-Ful Breach SIL 1 
13 Piping Leak (10% section)-100m Tolerable 
15 Gasket/Packing Blow-out Tolerable 
16 Turbine/Diesel Engine Over speed w/casing Breach Tolerable 
17 3rd Party Intervention Tolerable 
20 Pump Seal Failure SIL 1 
21 Unloading/Loading Hose Failure SIL 1 
22 Small External Fire (aggregate causes) Tolerable 
25 
Operator Failure (Routine procedure, well-trained, 










                                        METHODOLOGY 
 
This project is mainly to develop an application n which will utilize layer of protection 
analysis (LOPA) method to verify the safety integrity level of instrumented system. The 
development of this application has been done using information and communication 
technology (ICT) and simple programming software such as Microsoft Excel 2007 to 
perform the study. 
 
 3.1 Method of SIL Classification 
  
Safety integrity levels are categorized based on the probability of failure on demand 
(PFD) for a specific safety instrumented function (SIF). The categories PFD range has 
two types. According to ANSI/ISA 84.01-1996, the categories of PFD range from one to 
three. Meanwhile, as defined in IEC 61508 and 61511, the categories PFD range from 
one to four. Table 4 show the PFD ranges and associated risk reduction factor (RRF) 
ranges that correspond to each SIL.The degree of consequence of event will directly 
affect the SIL selection as discussed earlier. 
 
Based on Table 4, the highest SIL is 4 and the corresponding PFD is 10-5. Therefore, it 
has the limitation when the consequence of the event is too severe which further lead to 
very low of probability of failure on demand (PFD). In this case, the PFD that is beyond 
the range, will end up with too high of final SIL selection. An overdesign and high cost 
of SIS are expected. 
Table  4: Safety Integrity Levels and corresponding PFD and RRF (CCPS, 2001) 
LOPA ratio SIL PFD Range RRF range 
10-4 4 10-4 – 10-5 10000 – 100000 
10-3 3 10-3 – 10-4 1000 – 10000 
10-2 2 10-2 – 10-3 100 – 1000 
10-1 1 10-1 – 10-2 10 – 100 
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Before going further, the fundamental question on how frequently will failures of either 
type of function lead to accidents need to be clarified. There are two type of function 
which are functions with low demand rate and functions with high demand rate or 
operate continuously. For functions with a low demand rate, the accident rate is a 
combination of two parameters: 
 
• The frequency of demands 
• The probability of function fails on demand (PFD) 
 
The appropriate measure of performance of the function for this case is PFD or its 
reciprocal, Risk Reduction Factor (RRF). Based on that, the Table 9 gives the definition 
of SILs for low demand mode. On the other hand, for functions which have a high 
demand rate (operate continuously), the accident rate is the failure rate,  λ, which is the 
suitable measure of performance. An alternative measure is mean time to failure 
(MTTF) of the function. Noted that the failure must be exponentially distributed and 
MTTF is the reciprocal of  λ.  
  
According to Gulland (2004), the parameters discussed above are related each other and 
can expressed as showed in Equation 3 and 4: 
 
  PFD = λT2     or PFD = T(2 ×MTTF )                                             (3)     
      
 RRF = 2(λT)  or   RRF =  (2×MTTF )T                                         (4) 
Where: 
 λ = failure rate                                  
 T = time                                            
 MTTF = reciprocal of λ 
 PFD = Probability failure on demand 




The function can be proof-tested at a frequency which is greater than the demand rate. 
The term T indicates the proof-test interval. (Note that to significantly reduce the 
accident rate below the failure rate of the function, the test frequency should be at least 2 
and preferably ≥ 5 times the demand frequency.). Table 5 indicates definitions of SILs 
for functions which have a high demand rate or continuous mode.    
 
Table 5: Definitions of SILs for High Demand/ Continuous Mode (CCPS, 2001) 
SIL Range of 𝛌𝛌 (failures per hour) Ranges of MTTF (yr)2 
4 10-9 ≤  λ < 10-8 100000 ≥ MTTF > 10000 
3 10-8 ≤  λ < 10-7 10000 ≥ MTTF > 1000 
2 10-7 ≤ λ < 10-6 1000 ≥ MTTF > 100 
1 10-6 ≤ λ < 10-5 100 ≥ MTTF > 10 
 
SIL is determined based on PFD on a particular SIF.  Safety instrumented function is an 
action a safety instrumented system (SIS) takes to bring the process or the equipment 
under control to a safe state (Marszal and Scharpf, 2002). This function is single set of 
actions that protects against a sing specific hazards.A SIF’s sensors, logic solver and 
final elements act in concert to detect a hazard and bring the process to a safe state. 
Meanwhile, the safety instrumented system (SIS) is comprised of safety function (see 
SIF above) with collection of sensors, logic solvers and actuators. The SIS is 
implemented to protect the same process/project acts as backup to basic process 
controlled system (BPCS). Figure 8 shows the relationship between SIL, SIF and SIS. 
Every SIS has one or more safety functions (SIFs) and each affords a measure of risk 







Figure 8: Relationship between SIL, SIF and SIS (Magnetrol Bulletin, 2009) 
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3.2 Method of SIL evaluation on SIS  
 
 
3.2.1 Identify a hazardous event and assess its severity 
 
Start this methodology with a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study, the most 
commonly used methodology for process plant hazard evaluation from which the highest 
potential risk scenario are selected. Highest potential risk scenarios are scenario with 
high initiating event (cause) frequency and high unmitigated consequences. These 
scenarios can be easily detected by looking at the amount of existing or proposed 
protection systems (in the safeguards and recommendation columns) where a high 
number of protections can be related with high risk, or by searching explosion , fire or 
toxic release potential mentioned in consequences which can be referred in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 : Threshold frequency numbers for each consequence category (CCPS, 2001) 
Consequence severity Max. acceptable frequency 
Threshold Frequency Index, 
Ft 
Category 5 - Catastrophic 1/10000 3 
Category 4 – Major 1/1000 4 
Category 3 – Critical 1/100 5 
Category 2 – Minor 1/10 6 













In the system, consequence severity of each category can be selected from the dropdown 
list as shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Consequence severity dropdown list 
 
3.2.2 Identify the initiating event and access its frequency 
 
The initial event for a scenario is taken from the cause column in the HAZOP study. 
When each scenario has been evaluated with a risk matrix, its frequency can be 
determined from the evaluation. This value must be compared with ranges available in 
literature for validation. The system developed allow user to key in the initiating event 
frequency as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 














3.2.3 Identify the applicable independent protection layers and evaluate their 
effectiveness 
Assumption: 
For this method, the BPCS layer would not be considered because in a HAZOP, its 
failures are normally the initiating events. The emergency response layers are not taken 
into account because the objective is to end up not needing these protection layers. Thus, 
the following protection layers are considered in this methodology (Alarms and human 










           
                                    (a)                                                                   (b) 
Figure 11:  Interface of the system where list of IPLs are available to be selected. 
 
 
Figure 11 (a) shows the interface of the system where users are allowed to key in the 
PFD for each IPLs. In case of the PFD of each IPLs are not available, Figure 11 (b) 
shows the other option where users can select type of IPLs from the drop down list. 
Notice that once either the PFD value or types of IPLs are being selected, the SPFD will 






3.2.3.1 Effectiveness of layers 
Each layer evaluated using an index related to the order of magnitude of the PFD (SPFD) 
according to Table 7. The SPFD numbers allows us to translate the PFD in a value that is 
easy to manage. A low SPFD numbers indicates a protection with a low effectiveness and 
very high probability of failure in case we need it. The effectiveness of the protection 




Effectiveness of the protections which demoted as ES is shown in equation 5 while the 
system will calculate and display the ES value once all the IPLs have been specified as 
shown in Figure 12. 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  ∑𝐸𝐸PFD                                                          (5)       
 
The main advantage of using indexes instead of exponent numbers is shown here, where 
a multiplication of probabilities is handled as adding integer numbers. 
 
 
Figure 12: Output of the summation of all SPFD 
 
 
Table 7 : Probability of Failure on demand indexes (CCPS, 2001) 
Probability of failure on demand 
index (Spfd) 
Probability range 
Expected failure based on 
1000 demand 
0 1 > 1000 
1 1 to 10-1 100 to 1000 
2 10-1 to 10-2 10 to 100 
3 10-2 to 10-3 1 to 10 
4 10-3 to 10-4 0.1 to 1 
5 10-4 to 10-5 0.01 to 0.1 
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3.2.4 Calculate the expected frequency for the hazardous event 
 
The total protection effectiveness number is used to calculate the expected frequency for 
the hazardous event taking into account the IPLs. This frequency is called reduced 
frequency Fr. It can be found using Equation 6 (Campa and Cruz-Gomez, 2009). 
 
Fr = Fi - ES                                                          (6) 
 
Where: 
Fr = Frequency reduction 
Fi = Initiating index frequency 
ES = Effectiveness of protection 
 
The system will perform the calculation using equation 6 and display the result in the 
system interface.  
 
                                                                    
Figure 13: Output of the subtraction of Fi and ES 
 
 
3.2.5 Determine the need for additional layers of protection and the required SIL if 
a SIS is recommended. 
 
Once the reduced frequency (Fr) is obtained, it is necessary to compare it with the 
threshold frequency (Ft) for the selected scenario in Table 9. If the protection is 









However, the system will check whether it is overdesigned or not based on parameter 
which can be specified by users. In the risk control strategy column, no recommendation 
required which is denoted as NILL as shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14: Risk control strategy interface 
 
 
3.2.6 Determination of required SIL for an already installed SIS 
 
To determine the required SIL of previously installed SIS, it can be done by evaluating 
the risk of scenario without considering the SIS protection layer. Table 8 shows the 
value of SADD that will give the required SIL for the SIS. Equation 7 shows how the 
SADD is calculated. 
  









Table 8 : Determination of required SIL from SADD number ( CCPS, 2001) 
Sadd Required SIL PFD Range 
4 3 10-3 – 10-4 
3 2 10-2 – 10-3 
2 1 10-1 – 10-2 
24 
 





Fr ≤ Ft 
Protection are sufficient for risk scenario                  
(if Fr << Ft, then there is an over design according 
the acceptability criteria 
Fr > Ft The protection are insufficient for the risk scenario 
(the combined IPLs effectiveness are not enough to 
reduce the initiating event frequency to the maximum 
acceptable frequency for the scenario 
 
Need to establish a risk control strategy based on the 
required effectiveness. Frequency reduction, SADD = 
Fr  - Ft 
 
If we already have IPLs , we need to recommend 
improving the effectiveness of these layers (more 
frequent and systematized maintenance program, 
enhance operators response to alarms by training / 
emergency drill 
Case 1: SADD ≤ 1 
 
If there are no IPL applicable, need to recommend 
installing a non-SIS PL. Only if no non-SIS layers 
can be applied, we could suggest using a SIS with 
SIL 1 
 
Non-SIS protection layers and existing protection 
layer improvement must be suggested if possible and 
reevaluated to determine if this is enough. If no non-
SIS protection layers can be suggested and existing 
protection have been improved, we can suggest 
installing a SIS. 
Case 2: 2 ≤ SADD ≤ 4 
 
The value of SADD is very high and a SIS protection 
would not be enough to mitigate the risk. Therefore 
reevaluation of the equipment or process searching 
for a high effectiveness solutions and second, 
implement several SIS and non-SIS protection layers 
until the risk is at acceptable level. 
Case 3: SADD > 4 
 
If a SIS is recommended, the required SIL can be 
determined from the SADD value after considering the 




3.3 Tool Development 
 
The flow chart of the system is shown by Figure 15. It describes how the system works 
from raw data, processing it into useful information. Based on Figure 15, there are five 
main processes involve which are data key-in, input processing, display, calculation and 
output. There are three type of data required - consequence of severity, initiating event 
frequency and types of IPLs. Several equations mentioned in previous subchapter are 
used to calculate and assess the reliability of the SIS.  
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                                RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 SIS Evaluation  
 
In this chapter a complete simulation for SIL evaluation on SIS is discussed thoroughly. 
The simulation is built using the Microsoft Excel 2007 as the platform. The case study 
varies from different sources including literature reviews and industries. Several case 
studies are used in this study to test the simulation.  
 
Case 1: Failure of level transmitter (LT) indicating a false high level in a high pressure 
sour gas amine treatment unit
 
 (Campa and Cruz-Gomez, 2009). 
Figure 16 shows the simplified process flow of the absorber section of a high pressure 
sour gas amine treatment unit. Sour gas is a natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide 
(H2S). Lean amine is used to remove H2S in absorber column, T-1.  Based on HAZOP 
study of the process as shown in Table 10, the following scenario is selected (Node: 
High pressure amine absorber (T-1) and Deviation: high level).  
 
Figure 16: Process Flow diagram of for the absorber section of a sour gas treatment unit 




From Table 10, the essential information can be extracted and shown in Table 11. All 
the input data gained is then keyed in into the Safety Interlock System (SIS) Evaluation. 
 
Table 10: Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) study of the process 
Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendations 
Failure of LT indicating a 
false high level 
LV fully opens    Loss of 
liquid seal in T-1 column 
(LG indication is 
unreliable in this case) 
High pressure 
alarm in V-1 PIC 
and operator 
response 
Consider adding a SIS 
and implement a SIF 
for this scenario 
High pressure gas flows to 
low pressure flash tank V-
1 is not designed for this 
scenario 
Lock LV bypass valve 
in closed position 
LV bypass valve could be 
erroneously opened in an 
attempt to control the 'high 




with this scenario and 
train operators 
accordingly 




Table 11: Input data of case 1 
Consequence Description/Category 
Assuming Facility spacing is adequate. 
Personal concentrated in bunker control room 
at sufficient distance. 
 Category 4: Major ( Based on risk matrix ) 
Initiating event frequency  Failure of a level transmitter indicating false 
high level  ( 0.1) 
Independent Protection Layers 
1. BPCS alarm and Human Action 1 × 10-1 
2. Level Gauge (LG) LG indication is unreliable in this scenario 


















The consequence severity assigned is category 4: Major. It is categorized based sizes of 
release and consequences of production and facilities according to Figure 13 and 14. 
The initiating frequency for this scenario is 0.1, which give clear information of high 
probability of occurrence in plant lifetime and the corresponding index frequency 
denoted as 6. 
 
Although there are 3 IPLs as stated in Table 11, only one is applicable. Whereas, 
another two IPLs are not applicable due to reasons as already mentioned in Table 11. 
The only applicable protection is process alarm associated with operator response that 
yield a low effectiveness (SPFD = 1). Just one IPL with low SPFD number, the protection 
system is insufficient which cause the reduced frequency index is greater than threshold 
frequency index based on Figure 17. Due to insufficient protection system, the risk 
control strategy plays essential role to counter the problem. 
 
In this case, the program gives solutions which are arranged systematically as listed 
below: 
 
o If IPLs already exist, improve the protection layers (more frequent and 
systematized maintenance program, enhance operators response to 
alarms by training /emergency drill. 
o If there are no IPL applicable, need to recommend installing a non-SIS 
Protection Layer.  
o Only if no non-SIS layers can be applied, suggesting on using a SIS with 
SIL 1. 
 
The solutions are arranged in that manner is means to reduce the cost and to achieve 






In response to the suggestion given in the SIS Evaluation program, assume that the 
preventive maintenance is already being applied systematically and scheduled training 
and emergency drill have been carried out and no non-SIS is available, thus SIS with 
SIL 1 is recommended. SIL 1 is selected because the effectiveness required (frequency 
reduction), SADD is 1. The SIF is to shut down the emergency shutdown valve (ESV) 
which is installed in series. In normal practice, single valve will not be enough to meet 
SIL 1 requirement. Therefore, another ESV is need based on redundancy philosophy. A 
solenoid 3-way valve is needed on air pressure control line to control both ESVs 
installed in series. The conceptual design is shown in Figure 18. 
 
 


















Case 2: Cooling water failure with runaway reaction and potential for reactor 
overpressure, leakage, rupture, injuries and fatalities. Agitation is assumed (Crowl and 
Louvar, 2002) 
 
Figure 19 shows a safety system in a certain chemical reactor. The reactor contains a 
high-pressure alarm to alert the operator in the event of dangerous reactor pressures. It 
consists of a pressure switch within the reactor connected to an alarm light indicator. An 
automatic high-pressure reactor shutdown system is installed. The system is activated at 
a pressure higher than the alarm system and consists of a pressure switch connected to a 
solenoid valve in the reactor feed line. The automatic system stops the flow of reactant 








                Figure 19: Chemical reactor with an alarm and an inlet feed solenoid 
 
 
Table 12: Input data for case 2 
Consequence Description/Category 
Runaway reaction and potential for reactor 
overpressure, leakage, rupture, injuries and 
fatalities. Category 5: Catastrophic 
Initiating event frequency  BPCS instrument loop failure ( 0.1) 
Independent Protection Layers 
1. Inherent safe design 1 × 10-1 



































Figure 20 shows the result of the case 2. For case 2, the result indicates that the 
protection system is adequate to mitigate the undesired scenario. In the consequence 
severity box, catastrophic category is selected from the drop-down list which is shown 
in Figure 9. The corresponding threshold frequency index will then appeared which give 
the maximum acceptability criteria. The initiating event frequency inserted is 0.1, a 
medium probability of occurrence in the plant lifetime. The corresponding index 6 
appears in the cell. 
 
A protection with low SPFD number gives an indication that it is low effectiveness and 
has a high probability of failure in case it is needed. The first IPL in this case is 
inherently safe design. Assumption made is that if it is properly implemented, the design 
can eliminate scenarios or significantly reduce the consequences associated with a 
scenario. That is among the reason why the index for inherent safe design is high which 
give high reliability of the IPL. The second IPL is human response to alarm assuming 
that the procedures are clearly understood, with low stress. The SPFD is 1 indicating that 
it has low effective and has high probability of failure when it is in demand since it 
involves many external factors like lack of operation training and inadequate or 
nonexistent of management of change.  . 
 
However, the protection system is still sufficient as Frequency reduction, Fr is less than 
Threshold frequency, Ft. Thus, no risk control strategy and SIL required. If Fr is low 
than Ft, the protection system is overdesigned. Another question arises when it comes to 
‘how much protection layer really needed?’, ‘is it overdesigned?’. It is vital for everyone 
to know the minimum IPL needed as noticed that any additional IPL will skyrocketing 
the investment cost. There are no such references that give the minimum criteria value 
to be considered as overdesigned. Every company has their own standard value. In this 




























































































































































































CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
Prior determination of the appropriate SIL on a particular SIF requires one to evaluate 
thoroughly the concept of independent protection layer (IPL) to avoid intentionally 
incorporating an IPL failure into the initiating event frequency which will jeopardize the 
entire analysis.  A concept of semi-quantitative risk analysis is used throughout the 
study where it involves combination of HAZOP, LOPA technique and concept of SIL 
and SIS. Prior estimating the consequence and severity, HAZOP is used to select the 
most severe consequence which initiated by an event. Then, initiating event frequency 
can be specified.  The system developed gives user two alternative in specifying the 
IPLs. In case of PFD value is not available, there are many types of IPLs can be selected 
from the drop down list. Otherwise, user can key in the PFD value in the designated 
column. All the input data is converted from exponent number into index number for 
ease of adding the multiplication of probabilities. Analysis on the SIS is performed to 
check on the reliability and economical of the design. Recommendation is given based 
on the sufficiency of the protection. If the protection is insufficient, several strategies 
will be given - improving existing layer, installing non-SIS protection layer and 
installing a SIS with specific SIL. It is not always necessary to have a lot protection 
layer. Most scenarios can be catered by enhancing the existing design and 
instrumentation which minimizes the magnitude and frequency of deviation of the 
process. Therefore, dependency on safety system can be reduced. The tool developed 
can be used either in decision making which related in investment in additional of safety 
protection layer or improving the existing protection layer. Future study shall be 
continued to enhance the relevancy and reliability of the tool by considering more 
parameters in assessing a case. Thorough discussion with experts from industries is 
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